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    Removal Defense

    Detention That No Bond Hearing Can Reach

    For some categories the custody question is closed before it is asked: an immigration judge has no authority to set bond at all. What remains is a narrower hearing about whether the person belongs in the category in the first place.

    Removal Defense6 min readFederal lawBond and custody

    A tall chain link fence topped with coiled wire against a flat overcast sky above a paved empty yard
    For certain categories the custody question is answered by statute rather than by a judge. — Michael Pardo from Niagara, Canada, CC0, source.

    The rule in short

    The detention statute requires custody for people charged with certain criminal and security grounds, and the regulation removes those categories, along with arriving noncitizens, from an immigration judge's redetermination authority. The only argument available before the judge is that the person is not properly included in the category. That hearing turns on whether the conviction actually matches the ground charged, not on ties, hardship or rehabilitation.

    Most custody disputes are arguments about evidence: who this person is, what they have done, and whether they will come back to court. A smaller set of cases never reaches that argument. For certain categories the statute directs custody and the regulation strips the immigration judge of authority to revisit it, so the hearing that would decide danger and flight risk simply does not happen.

    Which categories are covered

    The detention statute requires custody of any person who is inadmissible by reason of having committed an offense covered by the criminal inadmissibility ground; who is deportable by reason of an offense covered by the multiple crimes of moral turpitude ground, the aggravated felony ground, the controlled substance ground, the firearms ground, or the miscellaneous crimes ground; who is deportable for a single crime involving moral turpitude where the sentence imposed was at least one year; or who falls within the terrorism-related inadmissibility or deportability grounds.

    The statute attaches this obligation when the person is released from criminal custody, and it says the obligation applies without regard to whether release was on parole, supervised release or probation, and without regard to whether the person may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.

    The Supreme Court has read that release language narrowly against the person detained: the custody requirement is not forfeited because immigration authorities failed to make the arrest at the moment of release. A gap of months or years between release from criminal custody and immigration arrest does not move the case back into the ordinary bond framework.

    The regulation that closes the door

    The statute directs custody; the regulation is what removes the judge. It states that an immigration judge may not redetermine conditions of custody imposed by the agency for several classes: people in exclusion proceedings; arriving noncitizens in removal proceedings, including those paroled after arrival; people described in the security and terrorism-related deportability ground; and people in removal proceedings subject to the mandatory custody provision.

    The arriving category catches people who are not thought of as criminal cases at all. Someone who presented at a port of entry and was paroled in is within it, which means a bond request to the immigration judge cannot succeed regardless of family, employment or the strength of the case.

    The same regulation carries a separate and easily missed provision. It states that nothing in it prevents a person from seeking a redetermination of custody conditions from the detaining agency itself under the parts of the regulations that govern inspection and detention. That request is made to the agency rather than to the court, and it is the only custody avenue open in the arriving category.

    SituationJudge may set bond?Argument that remains
    Charged only with unlawful presence, no listed offenseYesOrdinary danger and appearance findings
    Charged under a listed criminal groundNoThat the conviction does not match the ground charged
    Arriving noncitizen, including one paroled after arrivalNoThat the person is not properly classified as arriving
    Security or terrorism-related ground chargedNoThat the person is not described in that ground
    Removal order already finalNoCustody is governed by the post-order scheme instead

    The hearing that is still available

    The same regulation preserves one route. Nothing in it is to be construed as preventing a person from seeking a determination by an immigration judge that the person is not properly included within the listed paragraphs. That hearing is about classification, not release.

    The argument is almost always the same shape. The government has charged a ground; the person contends that the conviction does not in fact establish that ground; and if the contention is substantial, the mandatory category does not apply and an ordinary custody hearing follows. The threshold is deliberately modest, because the hearing is not the merits trial on removability and does not decide it.

    Preparation for it is documentary rather than personal. What decides the question is the text of the statute of conviction, the elements a jury would have had to find, and the contents of a conviction record that a judge is permitted to read. Character letters and hardship evidence, which carry a hearing about release, do nothing here.

    Where the argument fails, the judge records that the person is properly included and no bond decision follows. This is why the work here is identical to the work done on the merits of a criminal charge, using the categorical approach to comparing a statute against a federal definition and, where the statute of conviction lists alternative elements, the limited record described in divisible statutes and the documents a judge may read.

    Do not concede the ground at the pleading and then argue about custody

    The classification hearing depends on the ground being genuinely contested. A concession of removability under a listed criminal ground, given at the pleading to move the case along, settles the classification question at the same time. The custody argument and the merits argument have to be planned together, because the first answer given in court can close the second.

    Whether length of detention changes anything

    Detention under these provisions can last a long time. The Supreme Court has upheld detention without an individualized bond hearing for the period necessary to complete removal proceedings, and has separately declined to read the detention statutes as implicitly requiring a fresh bond hearing once detention becomes prolonged.

    That leaves constitutional challenges to prolonged detention, which are brought in a federal district court rather than in immigration court, and which have developed differently in different circuits. There is no single national answer, and a claim that succeeds in one circuit may not be available in another. Anyone considering that route needs advice specific to the circuit in which the detention facility sits, which is one reason mandatory detention counsel is engaged early rather than after months have passed.

    What to do with the time

    Where the category clearly applies and no classification argument exists, the realistic aim shifts from release to speed. Detained dockets move quickly, and a case that is ready moves faster than one that is not. Filing relief applications promptly, requesting biometrics appointments without delay, and getting country conditions or expert material in early all shorten the period in custody.

    The opposite instinct, asking for repeated continuances while evidence is gathered, has a direct cost in custody time. The good cause standard that governs those requests is set out in continuances, good cause and waiting on another agency, and a judge weighing a request from a detained person is conscious of what delay means.

    Where a favorable custody outcome is reached on a classification argument, the ordinary findings then apply, and the evidence for them is described in bond amounts, flight risk and danger findings. That packet is worth preparing in advance, because the classification ruling and the release decision are often made in the same sitting.

    Points to carry away

    • The statute directs custody for people charged with defined criminal and security grounds, without an individualized bond decision.
    • The regulation withdraws the immigration judge's authority to redetermine custody for those categories and for arriving noncitizens.
    • A person may still ask the judge to find that the category does not properly include them.
    • Custody attaches even when the person was not taken into immigration custody immediately upon release from criminal custody.
    • The detention statute has been read not to require a fresh bond hearing simply because detention has become lengthy.

    Questions readers ask

    Does the category depend on the charge or on the conviction?

    On the charge the government has actually brought, read against the conviction record. The statute reaches people who are inadmissible or deportable by reason of specified offenses, so the analysis starts with which ground has been charged and then asks whether the conviction supports it. A charge alone does not settle the matter, which is precisely what the narrow hearing about category membership exists to test. Where no charge in the case falls inside the list, the ordinary custody rules apply.

    Is there any release valve inside the statute itself?

    One, and it is very narrow. Release is permitted where it is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or close associate of such a person, and only where the person also satisfies the government that release would not pose a danger and that appearance is likely. It is not a general hardship exception and it is rarely invoked.

    What happens to custody after a removal order becomes final?

    It shifts to a different statutory scheme governing detention and removal after an order, with its own removal period and its own supervision provisions. Detention after an order is not treated as indefinite, and where removal is not reasonably foreseeable the continued holding of a person raises separate questions decided outside the immigration court. Practically, the custody arguments that matter after an order are made to the detaining agency or in a federal district court, not to the immigration judge.

    Sources

    1. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 — Apprehension and detention of aliensSubsection (c) lists the categories requiring custody and the single narrow release provision.
    2. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 — Custody/bondWithdraws redetermination authority for the listed classes and preserves the category challenge.
    3. Nielsen v. Preap, U.S. Supreme CourtHolds that the custody requirement is not lost because arrest did not follow release immediately.
    4. Jennings v. Rodriguez, U.S. Supreme CourtReads the detention statutes as not implicitly requiring periodic bond hearings.
    5. Demore v. Kim, U.S. Supreme CourtUpholds detention without an individualized bond hearing during removal proceedings.
    6. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 — Detention and removal of aliens ordered removedGoverns custody after a removal order, on a separate footing from custody during proceedings.

    Metro Law Advisors is a publication, not a law firm. This article states general rules and cites its sources; it is not advice about any particular case, and the law differs by state and changes over time.

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